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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent Financial Crisis made access to credit from banks more difficult and imposed 
financial constraints on Portuguese small and young firms (Iyer et al., 2014). It has been 
suggested that access to financing, credit extension and favourable lending options become 
less available to small and young firms during times of macroeconomic instability 
(McGuinness and Hogan, 2014; Cowling et al., 2015; Beck et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, the risk of such firms exiting the market increases, as predicted by the 
industrial economics theory of firm exit (e.g. Geroski et al., 2010; Caves, 1998; Everett 
and Watson, 1998; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Siegfried and Evans, 1994). Moreover, an 
erosion of market confidence compounded financial constraints making financial 
assistance from Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and International 
Monetary Fund) HVVHQWLDOWRVXVWDLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHEWDQGSUHYHQWLQVROYHQF\ 
Credit constraints, on the one hand, are known to lower the innovation, growth and 
survival of small businesses in particular (e.g. Saridakis et al., 2013; OECD, 2012; 
Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Geroski and Machin, 1993), 
which is the predominant firm size in Portugal (SMEs represent 99% of all business 
population). It has also been argued that there is a differential response of firms in terms of 
growth and survival, depending on their access to capital and on their network structure. 
Furthermore, the fact that smaller firms lack control of their external environment (Storey 
and Sykes, 1996) and are more sensitive to funding and demand shocks than larger firms, 
also reduces their chances of survival (Holton et al., 2014; Mach and Wolken, 2012; Artola 
and Genre, 2011; Raz and Gloor, 2007; Berger and Udell, 2002; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994). On the other hand, shocks to the bankV¶ balance sheets and credit rating downgrades 
affect capital markets, interest rates and international relations. This is likely to affect 
ODUJHUILUPV¶IXQGLQJ international trade, investment and capital structure and hence their 
chances of growth and survival (e.g. Almeida et al., 2014; Claessens et al., 2012; Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, 2010; Lee et al., 2009; Liu, 2004).   
The determinants of firm exit and survival have been widely studied in both 
management and economic literature (see, for example, Hyytinen et al., 2015; 
Bhattacharjee et al. 2007, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Agarwal and Gort, 2002, Robson, 
1996). This paper, however, adds to the existing literature on firm survival in that we 
empirically investigate both the impact of the Financial Crisis (2008-09) and the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis (2010-11) on the survival of Portuguese firms, and examine whether this varies 
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according to firm size. Previous research finds that small firms have higher exit rates than 
large firms (see, for example, DeTienne and Wennberg, 2016), but our paper attempts to 
distinguish the effect of the two economic shocks on different sized firms contrasting the 
pre-crisis period to the Financial Crisis and the Debt Crisis eras. This allows us to reveal 
potential strategic differences in the levels of resilience and adaptability by firm size. We 
expect that the effect of the Financial Crisis will be more detrimental on smaller firms than 
larger ones, as larger firms are better prepared to withstand contraction in market demand, 
can access alternative financial sources during lending contractions, and are more likely to 
hold foreign affiliations (hence scatter the risks). But as the Financial Crisis transformed 
into a Sovereign Debt Crisis DQG WKHFRXQWU\¶V ULVNSUHPLXP LQFUHDVHd, the vulnerability 
and exposure of large firms is also expected to increase (due to a decrease in  the supply of 
credit to the country, trade shocks and balance sheet effects, for example).  
The choice of Portugal as the country for analysis is based on the fact that while for 
most OECD countries the Great Recession relates to the economic contraction that 
followed the Global Financial Crisis (see van Ours, 2015), Portugal ± similar to other 
GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) ± has not only experienced the 
economic contraction that the Financial Crisis precipitated, but also embarked on a fiscal 
consolidation programme to restore debt sustainability. Hence, Portugal offers a good 
setting to study the effect of different shocks on firm survival. Given that our analyses are 
focussed on the patterns of firm closure before and during the recent crises, we use data for 
the period between 2002 and 2012.1 The longitudinal employer-employee data used allows 
us to track firms over the study period and to control for characteristics of each firm and of 
its workforce.  
Our results are interesting and shed more light on the importance of firm size on 
firm survival. We show that smaller firms are more likely to shut down than larger firms, 
with micro firms being nearly twice more likely to close down than large firms. This is 
quite a standard result within the existing empirical literature. Interesting results, however, 
are found when we distinguish between the two shocks. Specifically, we find that medium 
sized firms are more vulnerable during the Financial Crisis period, but show more 
resilience during the Sovereign Debt Crisis. In contrast, micro firms experience increasing 
rates of survival between the two crises. This result supports evidence from previous work 
in that smaller firms are able to adapt to recession conditions in ways (e.g. reducing 
salaries and working time, innovation) that enable them to survive (Bartz and Winkler, 
2016; Lai et al., 2016; Smallbone et al., 2012; Kalbfleisch, 2006). Overall, although we 
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find that the two crises led to an increase in the hazard rates of firm shutdown, firms faced 
higher probability of closing during the Sovereign Debt Crisis than during the Financial 
Crisis. To some extent, some of the shutdowns occurring in 2010 and after may be a 
consequence of the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, but during the austerity period market 
demand, economic growth, consumer confidence and access to bank financing suffered 
sharp declines putting further SUHVVXUH WR WKH ILUPV¶ OLIHVSDQ (Acharya et al., 2015; 
Ferrando et al., 2015; ECB, 2013).  We also find that downsizing reduces the likelihood of 
survival. Hence, firms are called to adopt alternative structural reforms to address domestic 
market position, and improve their competiveness in global markets. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of the 
Portuguese economy. Section 3 describes the longitudinal linked employer employee data 
used, the Quadros de Pessoal from Portugal. In Section 4 we present our empirical strategy 
and econometric specification. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY 
 
In the early 2000s, Portugal was reported as having high rates of labour force participation 
and low unemployment rates. This strong labour market performance was typically 
explained by flexible real wage adjustments and an expansion in the use of atypical 
contracts such as temporary and/or fixed term employment. The challenge to policymakers 
was to raise the income levels and increase competitiveness through the improvement of 
the productivity of the labour force by enhancing human capital and labour mobility. Low-
skilled sectors were facing greater levels of competition from new EU members, 
suggesting that the economy needed to shift its production towards more high-
skilled/higher-value-added sectors (OECD, 2004).  
Since 2006, however, the OECD reported concerns about rising unemployment in 
Portugal, and the need to prevent cyclical unemployment from becoming structural 
(OECD, 2010). More attention was drawn to restrictive employment protection legislation 
which acted as a barrier to labour mobility. Low levels of mobility encouraged firms to use 
fixed-term contracts which reduced incentives to provide training (OECD, 2006). The 
strategy adopted was to impose less restrictive employment legislation, in order to 
facilitate labour mobility, create jobs, and integrate job seekers back into work. This was 
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expected to shorten unemployment spells and encourage firms to offer permanent contracts 
and provide training opportunities for their employees.  
Although the Portuguese economy continued to grow after the burst of the 
Financial Crisis (see Pereira and Wemans, 2015), it had already started to show warning 
signs (e.g. low productivity growth, large budget and current accountV¶ deficits) of 
potential economic deterioration (Blanchard, 2007). Furthermore, given the economic and 
financial circumstances, between 2007 and 2009 banks imposed tighter credit constraints 
to non-financial firms (Artola and Genre, 2011), and Portuguese banks were not an 
exception. In April 2011, Portugal became the third Eurozone country (after Greece and 
,UHODQGWRUHFHLYHD³EDLORXW´ Since 2008, one in seven jobs has been lost, the volume of 
productive investment has declined by over one third, average per capita income has 
declined over 10%, the self-employment rate has decreased from 19% in 2007 to 16.8% in 
2012, and the unemployment rate of young people exceeded 37% in 2013 (ILO, 2014). 
Using time series data for the Portuguese economy over the period 1995-2014 
(Bank of Portugal, 2015) we dated the phases of the economic cycle.2 Figure 1 plots 
Portuguese GDP quarterly data (in million euros) for the period 1995 to 2014 and marks 
the turning points of the business cycle (left hand side axis); it also plots the evolution of 
the Diffusion Index on the banks¶credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or 
credit lines to enterprises (right hand side axis).3 As can be seen, over the period of 
analysis the economic cycle shows three peaks: first quarter of 2002, first quarter of 2008 
and third quarter of 2010 (2002q1, 2008q1, and 2010q3); and 3 troughs (2003q2, 2009q1, 
and 2012q4). Specifically, the first phase of economic contraction (2002q1 ± 2003q2) is 
associated to the dot-com crisis. The second phase of economic contraction (2008q1 ± 
2009q1) relates to the Global Financial Crisis. This was accompanied by a strong 
tightening of the standards for credit supply (more positive Diffusion Index). The phase of 
economic expansion that followed is likely to be due to the conjuncture measures RI³7KH
(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF5HFRYHU\3ODQ´>((53@RI1RYHPEHUDLPHGDWFRQWUROOLQJWKH
effects of the Financial Crisis. The EERP had two pillars: (i) a major injection of 
purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and stimulate confidence (European 
Commission, 2008: p. 2) and (ii) short-term actions to reinforce long-term competition 
through strategic investments, and other measures to support product- and labour-markets. 
,QVXPPDU\WKH((53SURSRVHG³DFRXQWHU-cyclical macro-economic response to the crisis 
in the form of an ambitious set of actions to support the real economy. The aim is to avoid 
DGHHSUHFHVVLRQ´ EC, 2008: p. 6). Despite the overall aim of the EERP the Portuguese 
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economy experienced a severe economic contraction between 2010q3-2012q4, as a result 
of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of late 2009 (for details on the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis see, e.g. Lane, 2012). The phase of economic contraction associated to the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis was also accompanied by increased credit constraints.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
During the Great Recession there was a massive exit of firms from the market and 
net firm destruction in the Portuguese economy. :HXVH(XURVWDW¶VGDWDRQILUPV¶
births and deaths for the period 2004-2014 to describe the demography of all active 
Portuguese firms (regardless of having registered employees).4 Figure 2 shows the patterns 
of firm entry and exit between 2004 and 2013. As the Figure shows, firm creation is more 
cyclical than firm exit.5 Furthermore, until 2008 there was net firm creation in the country, 
as the number of firm births outweighed the number of firm deaths. The stock of firms in 
the Portuguese economy, however, started to decline from 2008 onwards. The number of 
firm births was severely reduced until 2010, while the number of firm deaths remained at 
high levels. Given the severe fluctuation in economic activity during crisis, in the presence 
of entry costs, the exit of firms is likely to have a lasting effect on the number of active 
firms and permanent negative effects on productivity (van Ewijk, 1997). 
Our main interest lies in the hazard of firm shutdown, and we are particularly 
interested in identifying whether the effect of firm size varies not only over the business 
cycle, but also with the type of shock (Financial Crisis, Sovereign Debt Crisis) that leads to 
the phases of economic contraction. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
 
3. DATA 
 
The data used in this study are from the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) from Portugal. This is a 
longitudinal data set with matched information on workers and firms from 2002 to 2012.6 
The Portuguese Ministry of Employment has collected the data annually since 1985 and 
the participation of firms with registered employees is compulsory by law. The survey is 
administered in October, and filled in by the firms. Furthermore, firms are required to have 
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the survey available for public consultation, which ensures an unusual level of data 
coverage and accuracy. The data include all firms (over 250,000 per year) and employees 
(more than two million per year) within the Portuguese private sector. Each firm and each 
worker has a unique registration number, which allows them to be traced over time. We 
restrict our analysis to manufacturing and services, and the resulting sample is composed 
of 544,645 unique firms contributing to 2,818,631firm-year observations over the period.7 
Our data does not explicitly identify firm closures. We assume that firms exit the market 
when they are last observed in the data. Hence the variable reporting a firm¶V death takes 
the value 1 in year t if the firm is last observed that year, and 0 otherwise. 8 
In Table 1 we provide a brief description of the sample size and rates of firm 
shutdown by year. Both the stock of firms in each year and the proportion of firms dying 
between two time periods reveal the effects of the Great Recession. For example, in 
column (i) we find that the number (stock) of private sector firms in the economy initially 
rises from 234,340 firms in 2002 to 283,260 in 2008. In 2009 there was net destruction of 
about 8,000 firms with the stock of active companies being 275,594. The number of firms 
shutting down between t and t+1 as a proportion of the number of firms in year t ranged 
from nearly 10% in the first half of the decade to 20% in 2009 and 17% in 2011 (column 
ii). Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, there was net reduction in the stock of 
firms in the Portuguese economy, and the number of active firms in 2012 was the lowest 
observed over the period of analysis.9  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
We analyse the determinants of the risk of firm shutdown by estimating duration models of 
the probability of firm shutdown in t+1 conditional on survival up to time t. The key focus 
in this analysis is on whether, and if so how, the impact of firm size changed during the 
recent crises. We estimate the hazard rate of firm shutdown between two consecutive years 
(t and t+1) using a discrete time multivariate proportional hazards approach. In particular, 
we apply a complementary log-log model with firm-specific random effects (Jenkins, 
2005).10 The nature of our data implies that we have an inflow sample with left truncation 
and right censoring. That is, we include in our sample all firms existing in 2002 plus firms 
that were created between 2002 and 2011, and we observe only a proportion of them 
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shutting down over the period. Because information on the year the firm was created is 
available in our data, we are able to model the time dependence of the risk of closing. In 
other words we can model the correlation between the probability of firm shutdown and 
the age of the firm (see Jovanovic, 1982). We do this using a non-parametric baseline 
hazard rate identified by duration-interval-specific dummy variables. We allow the 
baseline hazard rate to vary yearly up to the 50th year of survival of the firm. We assume 
the hazard to be constant thereafter. 
The hazard rate h(t) is conditional on a range of observed covariates (x) as well as 
firm survival (t), such that 
; x) t |T (T = th(t) = jj tPr .     (1) 
We assume that firm j shuts down between t and t+1 with probability Pr(yjt=1)=O j and that 
it survives with probability Pr(yjt=0)=1±O j. We further assume that this probability is a 
function of covariates (x) and of an unobserved firm-specific effect (\ j), such that the 
hazard rate can be expressed by the following: 
jk22110jt ...= \EEEEO  kjtjtjt xxx     (2) 
Although our underlying continuous time model is summarized by the hazard rate h(t), our 
data is interval-censored (that is, we do not know the exact date when a firm closes). 
Therefore, we estimate the parameters describing the hazard rate taking into account the 
discrete nature of the duration data using a complementary log-log specification 
j22110]1log[log \ kjtkjtjtjt xȕ...xȕxȕ =ȕ)Ȝ(  (3) 
This implies 
jtXe
jt e
'
Ö
1Ö
E
O  
   (4) 
where jtO

is the estimated hazard rate of firm shutdown conditional on the vector of 
observed characteristics (X) that includesWKHILUP¶VVL]HPLFURVPDOOPHGLXPODUJH11, 
ownership of the firm (whether private-national, public, or foreign owned), natural log of 
WKH ILUP¶V VDOHV YROXPH LQ UHDO WHUPV and the legal form of the firm (whether quota 
society, individual name, unipersonal quota society, anonymous society or other), industry 
(17 industries), region (North, Algarve, Centre, Lisbon, Alentejo, and Islands).12 We also 
control for aggregate characteristics of the labour force to account for human capital 
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accumulation (mean seniority, mean potential labour market experience, proportion of 
workers that have university degrees, and proportion of high-skilled workers13), and for the 
stability of workforce, since a more stable workforce is likely to accumulate more firm-
specific human capital and, consequently, be more productive (proportion of women, mean 
age of the workforce, proportion of fixed-term contracts and of part-time workers). As 
discussed previously, time dependence is captured by a set of variables indicating the 
ILUP¶V age. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are shown in Table 2 below.14  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5. ESTIMATES OF HAZARDS OF FIRM-SHUTDOWN 
 
5.1 Main results 
In this section we examine whether the effect of firm size varies over the business cycle 
and with the type of shock associated to the phase of economic contraction. To this end, we 
construct a time index to separate the pre-crisis period (2002-2007) from the Financial 
Crisis period (2008-2009) and the Sovereign Debt Crisis period (2010-2011), although the 
two crises are interrelated. We then estimate a model that allows the impact of size to vary 
before and during the crisis, using a specification where size is interacted with the time 
indicator variable. Because firm size is a dynamic concept (labour is a variable production 
IDFWRU ZH KDYH LGHQWLILHG WKH ILUP¶V PRGDO VL]H FDWHJRUy to ensure that each firm 
contributes to one size category alone.15 Yet, we also estimate model specifications that 
FRQVLGHU WKH ILUPV¶ FRQWHPSRUDQHRXV VL]H DQG WKHVH UHVXOWV DUH SUHVHQWHG DV UREXVWQHVV
tests in the next section. 
Estimates of the hazard of firm shutdown are presented in Table 3 for the whole 
sample, and in Table 4 for the sample split into sub-periods (pre-crisis and crisis). We 
report hazard ratios which summarise the proportional effect on the hazard rate of a one 
unit change in the covariates, such that a hazard ratio above (below) one implies a 
proportionate increase (decrease) in the probability of a firm closing. 
Estimates using the full sample are presented in Table 3. In column (1) of Table 3, 
we present a basic model that, besides the set of covariates mentioned above, includes only 
the main effects of the firm (modal) size categories and the time periods. The next three 
columns of Table 3 include interaction terms between firm (modal) size and time period. In 
column (2) we include the following period indicators: Financial Crisis (2008-2009) and 
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Debt Crisis (2010-2011) as covariates, the omitted category is the pre-crisis period; in 
column (3) we include one period indicator: Financial Crisis (2008-2009), all other periods 
are included in the baseline; in column (4) we include one period indicator: Debt Crisis 
(2010-2011), the other two periods are omitted.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Results in Table 3 show that, in general, smaller firms are more likely to shut down 
than larger firms. In particular, the hazard of firm shutdown is found to be nearly two times 
larger for micro firms relative to larger firms. As firm size increases, the hazard ratio 
declines: small firms have between 25% and 35% higher hazard rates of shutdown as 
larger firms, whereas the medium sized firms are only 18% more likely to go out of 
business. These results can be partly understood under the Schumpeterian competition 
model of Nelson and Winter (1982). Large firms have more resources to withstand 
competitive pressures and demand shocks, and spend more in R&D than small firms. This 
may increase their chances of finding a better technology that will induce productivity 
gains and contribute to further firm growth (Cefis and Marsili, 2005). The productivity 
gains make it profitable for firms to hire more workers as long as they have a market that 
absorbs the increases in production. Because large firms can exploit a new technology on a 
relatively large scale they adopt new technology more quickly, which increases their 
chances of survival compared to smaller firms (Kepler and Simons, 2000). Additionally, 
large firms are required to disclose financial information related to payment practices and 
performance (Storey, 1994), thus minimising information asymmetries and monitoring 
costs. In contrast, financial reports produced by small firms are relatively simple and 
mainly for tax purposes (Tsaih et al., 2004) and not readily available to financial 
institutions (e.g. banks) when seeking funding to finance investment and sustain growth 
(see Fraser et al., 2015). Furthermore, large firms have greater assets (which can be used as 
collateral) than small firms and thus, are more likely to be charged lower rates when 
borrowing and are less likely to experience loan rejection and discouragement (Saridakis 
and Storey, 2009).  
In column (2) of Table 3 we report the coefficients of the financial and sovereign 
debt crises dummies and their interactions with firm (modal) size. The time period dummy 
variables are found to be individually and jointly (Wald test statistic of 35.66 with a p-
value of 0.00) statistically significant.16 In particular, we find that during the Financial 
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Crisis firms have higher hazard of closing down than in the pre-crisis period, and the risk 
was slightly higher in the years of Sovereign Debt Crisis (the hazard ratio ranges from 2.00 
in the Financial Crisis to 2.09 in the Debt Crisis). When the crises dummies are interacted 
with firm (modal) size, we find that the relative risk of shutdown differs only between 
medium sized firms and large firms during the Financial Crisis period.17 Specifically, 
medium sized firms are found to have around 29% higher hazard rate of shutdown than 
larger firms. This can be partly explained by difficulties in access to credit. Indeed during 
the two crises, loans to SMEs have decreased substantially and interest rates on new loans 
have increased nearly 2 percentage points between 2010 and 2012 (ILO, 2014), with 21% 
of the Portuguese firms reporting access to finance as a major obstacle in their business 
operations (ECB, 2013). Additionally, we can argue that medium sized firms usually 
operate under a structure similar to that of large firms (see Storey et al., 2010) and face 
similar problems, but have fewer resources available to overcome them. In contrast, micro 
and smaller firms are able to respond flexibly and operate under fewer structural 
constraints (Smallbone et al., 2012). Similar results emerge when we estimate the model 
including each crisis dummy at a time. 18 
Table A4 in the appendix reports the coefficients of a few other covariates used as controls 
in our specifications. Our results suggest that firms with larger sales volumes19, public and 
foreign owned firms, as well as multi-plant firms have a lower risk of closing. These firms 
are probably more likely to have stronger market positions and greater scope for strategic 
choices and (internal and external) alliances to withstand economic crises, thus increasing 
their chances of survival. Quota societies have significantly lower hazards of shutdown 
than firms based on other legal forms. Regarding the aggregate characteristics of the labour 
force, we conclude that our proxies for human capital accumulation (see Bosma et al., 
2004; Bruderl et al., 1992) and proxies for the stability of the labour force are important 
GHWHUPLQDQWV RI ILUPV¶ VXUYLYDO UDWHV )RU H[DPSOH ILUPV ZLWK JUHDWHU SURSRUWLRQV RI
university graduates and where the workers have higher mean labour market experience 
and seniority at the firm have lower hazards of shutting down. On the other hand, firms 
with greater intensity of fixed-term contracts, part-time workers, foreign nationals, and 
older workers have greater probabilities of closing.  
Additionally, Figure 3 illustrates how the predicted risk of firm shutdown evolves 
with the age of the firm and reveals the nature of duration dependence. We find that the 
hazard of firm shutdown is generally declining with time (negative duration dependence). 
However, the rate at which the hazard declines over time is not constant. In the first four 
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years the risk of firm closure is very high and declines only marginally (hazard rate of 
about 1.6 between the second and fourth years of age).20 The hazard steadily declines 
between the 5th and 20th year that a firm is in the market, and remains relatively constant 
thereafter (at about 0.8). In Table A5 in appendix we report the mean predicted hazards by 
firm size and time period.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In Table 4 we present sub-sample estimates of the hazard of firm closures, the 
parameterization of each of the columns in the Table is as follows: in column (1) we 
consider only observations of the pre-crisis period (2002-2007), and include indicators of 
firm size; in columns (2) and (3) the crisis period is considered (2008-2011). In column (2) 
we include indicators for size and time period (omitted category is the 2008-2009 Crisis); 
in column (3) we further add terms on the interaction of firm size and time period.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Results in Table 4 also suggest that smaller firms have higher hazard rates of 
closing than larger firms (similar to the results obtained in Table 3). However, the hazard 
of closing for micro firms is lower during the crises periods than in the pre-crisis period, 
whereas it increases for small and medium sized firms (contrast coefficients of firm size in 
columns (2) and (3) to those in column (1)).21 We also find that, on average, firms have 4% 
higher risk of going out of business during the Sovereign Debt Crisis than during the 
Financial Crisis (hazard ratios of the time period dummy of 1.04 in column (2)). When the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis dummy interacts with the firm size, only the firm size coefficients 
remain significant.  
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
5HVXOWVLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQVXJJHVWWKDWWKHULVNRIILUPV¶Vhutting down declines with 
firm size, and that medium sized firms have an increased risk of closing during the 
Financial Crisis. We also find evidence that firms are more likely to close during the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis than during the Financial Crisis - during the crisis period, the 
hazards of shutdown of small and medium sized firms are higher than those of the pre-
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crisis period, while the hazards of shutdown of micro firms is similar in the pre-crisis and 
the crisis period. All the results discussed earlLHUDUHREWDLQHGFRQVLGHULQJWKHILUPV¶PRGDO
size. In this Section we report robustness results to using alternative measures of firm size. 
We re-estimate WKH PRGHO VSHFLILFDWLRQV RI 7DEOHV  DQG  XVLQJ WKH ILUPV¶
contemporaneous size category alone; and using the contemporaneous size category along 
with controls for changes in employment at the firm level.22  These results are presented in 
Table 5. The first four columns of Table 5 relate to a specification with controls for the 
ILUPV¶FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVVL]e alone and columns (5)-(8) relate to the results when we add 
as control the change in employment at the firm level. Within each set of columns the 
structure of Table 5 resembles that of Table 3.  
Results in Table 5 suggest that the best fitting model (largest log likelihood) is the 
one where controls for year-on-year changes in employment are included. Hence, we will 
focus our discussion on the results reported in columns (5)-(8).23 Downsizing through 
layoffs is usually seen as a strategy to survive during times of economic hardship (see 
Cascio, 1993).  Also, in a recession, large firms are more likely than SMEs to downsize 
(Lai et al., 2016). Here we find that firms that reduce their number of employees can have 
26% larger hazard of shutdown than firms who kept a stable workforce; on the other hand, 
the hazard of closing for firms that are growing in terms of number of employees is only 
0.65 that of the hazard of firms who do not do so. For all other variables, estimates in 
Table 5 generally reinforce those obtained in the previous section. The hazard of shutdown 
of micro firms is around 2.4 to 2.7 times that of large firms and as firm size increases the 
hazard ratio declines. We also confirm that the risk of closing is higher during the 
Financial Crisis than in the pre-crisis period, and the risk was even higher in the years of 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis (the hazard ratio ranges from 1.97 in the Financial Crisis to 2.08 
in the Debt Crisis, column (6)). When the crises¶ dummies are interacted with firm size, we 
find evidence that the relative risk of shutdown differs only between medium sized firms 
and large firms during the Financial Crisis period (columns (2), (3) and (7).24  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In Table 6 we present sub-sample estimates of the hazard of firm closures as per 
Table 4, but using contemporaneous firm size (columns (1)-(6)) and controls for firm-level 
changes in employment (columns (4)-(6)). Yet again, results reinforce those obtained 
previously. Micro firms have similar relative risk of shutdown before and during crises. On 
12 
 
the other hand, the risk of closing for small and medium sized firms is larger during the 
crises periods than in the pre-crisis period (contrast coefficients of firm size in columns (5) 
and (6) to those in column (4)).25 Results in Table 6 also support the finding that firms face 
a higher probability of going out of business during the Sovereign Debt Crisis rather than 
during the Financial Crisis (hazard ratio of the time period dummy of 1.02, column (5). 
When the Sovereign Debt Crisis dummy interacts with the firm size, we find that medium 
sized firms have lower hazard rate of closing than large organizations (hazard ratio of 0.73, 
column (3)). This can be due to the fact that larger firms are more likely to be exposed to 
international economy and lay off (talented) workers who can then seek employment in 
smaller firms with growth potential (Lai et al., 2016; Saridakis, 2012).26 
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analysed a panel of linked employer-employee data from Portugal to 
empirically investigate whether the effect of firm size varies over the business cycle and 
with the shocks from the Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Although the two 
crises are interrelated, their effects are found to be different in nature and received different 
policy responses. We find a number of key results. First, smaller firms are more likely to 
shut down than larger firms, with micro firms being nearly twice more likely to shutdown 
than large firms. Second, micro firms are found to experience higher hazard rates of 
closing during the pre-crisis period than during crisis period. Third, this is not the case for 
larger sized firms for whom the closure rate is found to increase during the recession. The 
reasons for this are not reported in the data, but may be postulated. Micro firms, for 
example, are less exposed to foreign financial markets and risks, are less dependent on 
bank credit, and their HR procedures are more discretionary and flexible compared with 
larger firms. These factors allow micro firms to work more flexibly, rather than undertake 
structural shifts, and adapt to recession conditions in such a way that enables them to 
survive (Cowling et al., 2015; Smallbone et al., 2012; Reid, 2007; Grewal and Tansuhaj, 
2001; and Hitt, et al., 1998). Fourth, we find that medium sized firms were more 
vulnerable during the Financial Crisis period than large firms, but showed more resilience 
during the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Finally, the results suggest that the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis had higher impact on the risk of firm shutdown than the Financial Crisis.  
13 
 
The above analysis raises important questions and provides strategic options for 
interventions both by entrepreneurs and policy makers. Small and medium sized firms may 
seek to build financial resilience and capabilities to cope with challenging and prolonged 
environmental shocks (see also Smallbone et al., 2012). This can be done, for example, by 
reducing their dependence on conventional sources of external funding from financial 
institutions and cost-cutting measures when facing distress. In particular, small firms may 
be proactive and exploit new market opportunities, such as through foreign alliances, and 
adjust their product/service portfolio, business and labour market strategies to minimise 
risk and sustain competitive advantage to withstand times of economic turmoil and 
instability. Also, downsizing as management strategy may not be a panacea when a firm is 
in decline. Downsizing may affect firm internal functioning (e.g. LQFUHDVHHPSOR\HHV¶MRE
insecurity and damage motivation and commitment), provide signs of performance 
deterioration to the external environment (e.g. customers, creditors) and generally weaken 
a ILUP¶VVWUDWHJLFDQGFRPSHWLWLYHSRVLWLRQLQWKHPDUNHWSODFe. Given the magnitude of the 
shocks and the rate of firm exits, the economy is unlikely to be able to return to its original 
productivity growth path by itself (van Ewijk, 1997), hence there is room for public policy 
intervention. Policy makers may seek to encourage strategic changes and innovation within 
small organisations, and support innovation and new business ideas to help businesses 
mitigate the impact of recession (for detailed discussion, see Kitching et al., 2009). 
 Additionally, the unevenness of the impact of the sovereign and financial crises 
suggests that policy needs to be more attuned to help ameliorate the effects of specific 
FULVHVUDWKHUWKDQPHUHµEODQNHW¶DSSURDFKHV7KHXQHYHQHIIHFWVRQILUPVRIGLIIHUHQWVL]HV
also suggest a need for some fine-tuning of interventions depending on firm size. This will 
inevitably involve both fiscal and monetary strategic interventions. It is questionable, 
however, whether the fiscal consolidation and expenditure cuts are appropriate or else they 
may lead to the medicine being worse than the actual economic malaise. This is an issue 
that deserves future research.  
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of firms and death rates over the period, 2002-2011 
 
 All firms Micro Small Medium Large 
Year Nb. firms 
% 
Shut 
down 
Nb. 
firms 
% 
Shut 
down 
Nb. 
firms 
% Shut 
down 
Nb. 
firms 
% 
Shut 
down 
Nb. 
firms 
% Shut 
down 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
2002 234,340 9.79 189,864 11.10 37,943 4.47 5,736 2.67 797 2.13 
2003 243,531 9.11 198,250 10.28 38,460 4.09 5,986 3.32 835 2.51 
2004 251,103 9.53 205,226 10.72 38,864 4.41 6,140 3.29 873 2.18 
2005 270,600 10.22 222,101 11.41 41,227 4.93 6,395 3.77 877 2.39 
2006 273,103 10.32 224,796 11.52 41,017 4.93 6,407 3.81 883 3.40 
2007 279,048 11.19 230,209 12.35 41,636 5.98 6,325 4.35 878 3.64 
2008 283,260 12.43 234,968 13.59 41,156 7.09 6,272 5.21 864 3.01 
2009 275,594 19.94 229,076 21.53 39,607 12.51 6,063 10.52 848 6.49 
2010 243,333 12.87 201,025 14.10 35,901 7.36 5,583 5.62 824 3.40 
2011 239,417 17.14 198,530 18.83 34,698 9.51 5,372 6.09 817 4.53 
Total 
(02-11) 2,593,329 12.29 2,134,045 13.54 390,509 6.53 60,279 4.87 8,496 3.37 
Notes: Firm shutdown takes the value 1 in t if the firm is last observed in that period, and 0 otherwise. Death 
rates are percentages of the stock of firms in year t. Firm closures are not identifiable in 2012, the last year of 
our sample. Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal, Portugal, 2002-2012. 
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Table 2:  Summary statistics of firm-level data (sample means) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Firm shutdown 0.123 
 Size (baseline: large) 
  
   Medium 0.023  
   Small 0.153  
   Micro 0.821  
Period (baseline: pre-crisis) 
  
   Crisis (2008-2009) 0.215  
   Crisis (2010-2011) 0.186  
Ln(sales volume) 10.799 3.896 
Ownership (baseline: private national) 
 
   Public 0.002  
   Foreign 0.039  
Multi-establishment 0.077  
Legal form (baseline: limited liability quota societies) 
   Personally owned - unlimited liability 0.238  
   Personally owned - lim. liab. quota soc. 0.024  
   Anonymous societies 0.038  
   Other 0.057  
Proportion of high-skilled workers (%) 18.294 30.803 
Proportion of university graduates (%) 8.243 21.498 
Proportion of temporary contracts (%) 20.809 34.067 
Proportion of part-timers (%) 4.369 16.798 
Proportion of women (%) 46.651 41.708 
Proportion of foreign nationals (%) 4.624 17.343 
Mean experience in the labour market  21.245 9.182 
Mean seniority at the firm 5.597 5.365 
Mean age RIHPSOR\HH¶V 38.115 8.920 
No. of observations 2,593,084  
Note: Controls for industry, region, and a non-parametric specification of 
WKH ILUPV¶ VXUYLYDO WLPH (age) are included in the multivariate analysis. 
Their descriptive statistics are omitted in the Table for the sake of space. 
Standard deviations for continuous variables only. 
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Table 3: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, full sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm modal size category (baseline: large)  
  Medium 1.178** 1.053 1.178** 1.176** 
 
(0.080) (0.099) (0.087) (0.084) 
Small 1.279*** 1.151 1.354*** 1.252*** 
 
(0.084) (0.103) (0.096) (0.086) 
Micro 2.089*** 2.108*** 2.229*** 1.994*** 
 
(0.137) (0.188) (0.158) (0.137) 
Time period27     
Crisis (2008-2009) 1.916*** 2.002*** 1.592*** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.282) (0.209) 
 Crisis (2010-2011) 2.184*** 2.093*** 
 
1.569*** 
 
(0.015) (0.317) 
 
(0.222) 
Medium*Crisis (2008-2009) 
 
1.288* 1.231 
 
  
(0.190) (0.169) 
 Medium*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.163 
 
1.013 
  
(0.185) 
 
(0.150) 
Small*Crisis (2008-2009) 
 
1.207 1.136 
 
  
(0.171) (0.150) 
 Small*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.226 
 
1.079 
  
(0.187) 
 
(0.153) 
Micro*Crisis (2008-2009) 
 
0.932 0.926 
 
  
(0.131) (0.122) 
 Micro*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.022 
 
0.962 
  
(0.155) 
 
(0.136) 
Constant 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log-Likelihood -906,222 -906,050 -913,006 -914,912 
Nb. Observations 2,593,084 2,593,084 2,593,084 2,593,084 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard model of firm shutdown with firm-level 
frailty. Hazard ratios reported. Further covariates relating to characteristics of the 
firm and of the workforce, mentioned in Section 4, were included in the 
specification but, for the sake of space, their estimates are not shown here and are 
provided in Table A4 in appendix. SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01). 
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Table 4: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, by period 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm modal size (baseline: large) 
  Medium 1.032 1.304*** 1.372*** 
 
(0.097) (0.113) (0.159) 
Small 1.121 1.374*** 1.387*** 
 
(0.102) (0.115) (0.156) 
Micro 1.968*** 1.881*** 1.852*** 
 
(0.178) (0.158) (0.207) 
Period (baseline: Crisis 2008-2009)   
Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.036*** 1.007 
  
(0.006) (0.168) 
Medium*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
0.884 
   
(0.154) 
Small*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
0.978 
   
(0.164) 
Micro*Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.037 
   
(0.173) 
Constant 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log-likelihood -478,132 -427,082 -427,072 
Nb. observations 1,551,584 1,041,500 1,041,500 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard models of firm shutdown with 
firm-level frailty. Hazard ratios reported. Further covariates relating 
to characteristics of the firm and of the workforce, mentioned in 
Section 4 were included in the specification but their estimates are 
not shown. SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table 5: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown ± contemporaneous size, full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
Firm size (baseline: large)        
Medium 1.176** 1.078 1.153* 1.233*** 1.179** 1.090 1.162* 1.230*** 
 
(0.084) (0.110) (0.092) (0.097) (0.080) (0.109) (0.092) (0.095) 
Small 1.380*** 1.295*** 1.397*** 1.364*** 1.326*** 1.256** 1.394*** 1.336*** 
 
(0.095) (0.127) (0.107) (0.103) (0.087) (0.120) (0.106) (0.100) 
Micro 2.820*** 2.906*** 2.858*** 2.639*** 2.380*** 2.487*** 2.655*** 2.364*** 
 
(0.195) (0.284) (0.219) (0.199) (0.157) (0.236) (0.202) (0.176) 
Change in employment  
(baseline: no change) 
      
Downsize     1.261*** 1.260*** 1.255*** 1.224*** 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Upsize     0.650*** 0.649*** 0.642*** 0.643*** 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Period28         
Crisis  
(2008-2009) 
1.932*** 1.979*** 1.497*** 
 
1.830*** 1.971*** 1.585***  
(0.010) (0.305) (0.213) 
 
(0.009) (0.301) (0.225)  
Crisis  
(2010-2011) 
2.193*** 2.349*** 
 
1.722*** 1.935*** 2.080***  1.627*** 
(0.015) (0.375) 
 
(0.254) (0.013) (0.329)  (0.239) 
Medium*Crisis 
(2008-2009) 
 1.325* 1.335* 
 
 1.285 1.309*  
 (0.213) (0.198) 
 
 (0.205) (0.194)  
Medium*Crisis 
(2010-2011) 
 0.987 
 
0.844  0.981  0.863 
 (0.166) 
 
(0.131)  (0.164)  (0.134) 
Small*Crisis  
(2008-2009) 
 1.210 1.213 
 
 1.169 1.188  
 (0.188) (0.173) 
 
 (0.180) (0.170)  
Small*Crisis  
(2010-2011) 
 1.033 
 
0.921  1.030  0.949 
 (0.166) 
 
(0.136)  (0.164)  (0.140) 
Micro*Crisis  
(2008-2009) 
 0.955 0.994 
 
 0.908 0.961  
 (0.147) (0.141) 
 
 (0.139) (0.137)  
Micro*Crisis  
(2010-2011) 
 0.924 
 
0.885  0.921  0.915 
 (0.148) 
 
(0.130)  (0.146)  (0.135) 
Constant 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log-Likelihood -903,690 -903,566 -910,526 -912,569 -898,416 -898,270 -904,179 -906,882 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard model of firm shutdown, with firm-level frailty. Hazard ratios reported. All 
models have the same number of observations: 2,593,084. Further covariates relating to characteristics of the firm 
and of the workforce, mentioned in Section 4, were included in the specification but, for the sake of space, their 
estimates are not shown here and are provided in Table A3 in appendix. SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01). 
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Table 6: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, by period 
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm size (baseline: large)     
Medium 1.066 1.275*** 1.458*** 1.071 1.279*** 1.432*** 
 
(0.110) (0.117) (0.183) (0.106) (0.117) (0.179) 
Small 1.253** 1.407*** 1.532*** 1.218** 1.409*** 1.495*** 
 
(0.124) (0.125) (0.186) (0.116) (0.125) (0.182) 
Micro 2.660*** 2.448*** 2.549*** 2.266*** 2.308*** 2.324*** 
 
(0.263) (0.216) (0.309) (0.215) (0.204) (0.282) 
Change in employment  
(baseline: no change)      
Downsize    1.305*** 1.278*** 1.278*** 
    (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Upsize    0.634*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Period (baseline: Crisis 2008-2009) 
 
   
Crisis (2010-2011) 
 
1.030*** 1.135  1.020*** 1.045 
  
(0.006) (0.199)  (0.006) (0.183) 
Medium*Crisis (2010-2011)  0.728*   0.760 
   
(0.134)   (0.139) 
Small*Crisis (2010-2011) 0.826   0.874 
   
(0.145)   (0.154) 
Micro*Crisis (2010-2011) 0.918   0.988 
   
(0.161)   (0.173) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Log-likelihood -477,029 -425,853 -425,830 -474,107 -422,556 -422,526 
Nb. observations 1,551,584 1,041,500 1,041,500 1,551,584 1,041,500 1,041,500 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard models of firm shutdown with firm-level frailty. Hazard ratios 
reported. Further covariates relating to characteristics of the firm and of the workforce, mentioned in 
Section 4 were included in the specification but their estimates are not shown. SE in parenthesis (* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1:  Correlations between explanatory variables 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 
Shutdown Size Time ln(sales) Plant age Ownership Multiplant Legal Form 
Shutdown 1.0000 
       Size 0.0954 1.0000 
      Time 0.0713 0.0080 1.0000 
     ln(sales) -0.1242 -0.2555 0.0626 1.0000 
    Plant age -0.0857 -0.1970 0.0646 0.2121 1.0000 
   Ownership 0.0198 -0.0527 0.2522 0.0202 0.0318 1.0000 
  Multiplant -0.0397 -0.2689 0.0800 0.1239 0.1032 0.0584 1.0000 
 Legal Form 0.0015 -0.1198 0.0612 -0.1571 0.1351 0.1413 0.0608 1.0000 
 
Panel B: Workforce characteristics 
 
Shutdown 
% High 
skill 
% Uni. 
Grads 
% Fixed 
term 
% Part 
Time 
% 
Women 
% 
Foreign 
Mean 
Exper. 
Mean 
Tenure 
Shutdown 1.0000 
        % High skill 0.0020 1.0000 
       % Uni. Grads -0.0071 0.4477 1.0000 
      % Fixed term 0.0418 -0.0592 0.0112 1.0000 
     % Part Time 0.0235 0.0143 0.0577 0.0464 1.0000 
    % Women 0.0098 0.0070 0.0648 0.0457 0.1174 1.0000 
   % Foreign Nationals 0.0434 -0.0463 -0.0223 0.2117 0.0236 -0.0261 1.0000 
  Mean Experience 0.0136 0.0129 -0.1770 -0.1405 0.0625 -0.0285 -0.0409 1.0000 
 Mean Tenure -0.0692 0.0425 -0.0577 -0.2876 -0.0208 -0.0162 -0.1285 0.3929 1.0000 
Note: correlations based on the estimation sample. 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Transition matrix of firm size categories 
Size Large Medium Small Micro 
Large 91.80 7.57 0.40 0.23 
Medium 1.17 89.45 8.76 0.61 
Small 0.01 1.53 87.23 11.24 
Micro 0.00 0.02 2.22 97.76 
Note: own calculations based on the estimation sample. 
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Table A.3: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, alternative specification of the crisis period (2008-2011) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Firm size (baseline: large)  
Medium 1.192*** 1.069 
 
(0.080) (0.099) 
Small 1.302*** 1.178* 
 
(0.084) (0.105) 
Micro 2.118*** 2.156*** 
 
(0.137) (0.192) 
Period (baseline: pre-crisis 2002-2007) 
  
Crisis (2008-2011) 1.968*** 2.011*** 
 
(0.010) (0.240) 
Medium*Crisis (2008-2011)  1.229* 
 
 (0.154) 
Small*Crisis (2008-2011)  1.205 
 
 (0.145) 
Micro*Crisis (2008-2011)  0.954 
 
 (0.114) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log-Likelihood 
-906,451 -906,283 
Nb. Observations 2,593,084 2,593,084 
Notes: Discrete time (cloglog) hazard models of firm shutdown with firm-
level frailty. Hazard ratios reported. Further covariates relating to 
characteristics of the workforce, mentioned in Section 4, were included in the 
specification but their estimates are not shown. SE in parenthesis (* p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
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Table A.4: Hazard estimates of firm shutdown, full sample (Table 3 ctd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(sales volume) 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.944*** 0.942*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership (Baseline: private national) 
  
    Public 0.583*** 0.582*** 0.625*** 0.588*** 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) 
    Foreign 0.940*** 0.944*** 1.330*** 0.941*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
Multiplant firm 0.755*** 0.755*** 0.830*** 0.773*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Legal form (Baseline: quota societies) 
  
   Individual name 1.860*** 1.856*** 1.672*** 1.724*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
   Unipersonal quota soc. 1.066*** 1.068*** 1.697*** 1.098*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
   Anonymous society 1.017 1.011 1.011 1.012 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
   Other 1.069*** 1.068*** 1.023** 1.034*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
% of high skilled  1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% University graduates 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Fixed term contracts 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Part-time workers 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Women 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Foreign nationals 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean experience in LM 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.930*** 0.924*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mean seniority at firm 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.993*** 0.994*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean age 1.071*** 1.072*** 1.089*** 1.097*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Note: As in Table 3. 
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Table A.5: Predicted hazard of firm shutdown, by time period and firm size 
 Pre-crisis Financial Crisis Sovereign Debt Crisis Overall 
Large 0.022 0.044 0.038 0.030 
Medium 0.029 0.073 0.059 0.044 
Small 0.045 0.098 0.092 0.064 
Micro 0.104 0.182 0.184 0.136 
Overall 0.093 0.166 0.167 0.122 
Note: Hazards were predicted after estimating model (2) in Table 3 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: The Portuguese Business Cycle (2000-DQGWKH'LIIXVLRQ,QGH[RQEDQNV¶FUHGLWVWDQGDUGV 
 
<Figure1_cycle_di.wmf> 
Figure 2: The demography of Portuguese firms (all active companies) 
 
<Figure2_firmdem.wmf> 
 
Figure 3: Estimated pattern of duration dependence  
<Figure3_haz.wmf> 
 
Figure A.1: Active companies and number of deaths - estimation sample 
 
<FigureA1_firmdemQP.wmf> 
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1
 2012 is the most recent year for which the data set has been made available. Between 1994 and 2002 the 
Portuguese business cycle is described by one single phase of economic expansion. 
2The turning points of the series were identified applying NBER's methodology (Bry and Boschan, 1971) to 
quarterly data, as suggested by Harding and Pagan (2002), using Stata routine -sbbq- by Bracke (2011). 
3Bank Lending Survey (Bank of Portugal, 2013). The Bank Lending Survey started being collected in 
January 2003 and ended in April 2013, the purpose of this survey was to enhance the understanding of bank 
lending behaviour in the euro area. The survey is composed of 18 questions. The diffusion index reported 
here is that related to Question 1 of the Bank Lending Survey for the Eurozone: "Over the past three months, 
how have your bank¶s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises 
changed?". The diffusion index is the weighted difference between the share of banks reporting that credit 
standards have been tightened and the share of banks reporting that they have been eased. A positive net 
percentage indicates that a larger proportion of banks have tightened credit standards ("net tightening"), 
whereas a negative net percentage indicates that a larger proportion of banks have eased credit standards 
("net easing"). 
4According to Eurostat (2015) metadata a firm death amounts to the dissolution of a combination of 
production factors with the restriction that no other firms are involved in the event. Deaths do not include 
exits from the population due to mergers, take-overs, break-ups or restructuring of a set of firms. Also, it does 
not include exits from a sub-population resulting only from a change of activity.  
5
 Similar patterns of firm entry and exit over the business cycle were found by Huynh et al. (2010), using data 
for Canadian manufacturing firms (1985-1997); and by Lee and Mukoyama (2015), for a sample of 
manufacturing firms (1972-1997) in the USA. 
6QP data were not collected in 2001, hence our analysis starts in 2002; 2012 is the most recent year for which 
the data set has been built.  
7We exclude the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, extraction) as most firms are family businesses and 
coverage of this sector in the QP data is small.  
8
 Given that the QP panel ends in 2012, the number of firm deaths in 2011 are identified from a one-year 
window. Hence, firm closures for 2011 resemble the temporary statistics reported by the ONS (death events 
are usually definite after a two-year window). This can generate a slight over-estimate of the number of firm 
closures in the last year of our sample. We are not able to identify the reason why firms close. 
9
 In Figure A.1 in appendix we plot the number of active firms and firm deaths based on our estimation 
sample (QP data - firms with registered employees) and find that the pattern on the stock of firms and 
QXPEHURIILUPGHDWKVLVVLPLODUWRWKDWUHSRUWHGHDUOLHULQ)LJXUHXVLQJ(XURVWDW¶V%XVLQHVV'HPRJUDSK\
data that considers all active firms, regardless of having registered employees) the stock of firms increases 
until 2008 and declines thereafter; firm closures soar in 2008.  
10We use this discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model because our data 
are interval censored. That is, we know the firm leaves the panel between t and t+1 (last observed in t) but 
we do not know the exact date when this event occurs. 
11
 Firm size is measured as the number of employees working at the firm. Firms are grouped into four 
categories of size, following the European Recommendation 2003/361: (i) micro, if they employ less than 10 
workers; (ii) small, if they employ more than 9 and less than 50 workers; (iii) medium, if they employ more 
than 49 and less than 250 workers; and are (iv) large, if the employ more than 249 workers. 
12
 +X\QKHWDOKDYHVKRZQWKDWILUPV¶LQLWLDOIinancial conditions are relevant factors affecting their 
VXUYLYDOSURVSHFWV+RZHYHURXUGDWDGRHVQRWKDYHILUPV¶ILQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQKHQFH WKHHIIHFWRI WKHVH
variables is likely to be captured as unobserved heterogeneity. 
13Firms are requested to classify workers into nine skill levels according to the complexity and responsibility 
of the tasks performed; we group these into three categories: high, medium and low skilled workers. 
14
 The average rate of firm closures over the period of analysis is 12%. Smaller firms dominate the market 
with 97% of the firms in this sample being micro (less than 10 workers) or small firms (with 10 to 49 
employees). The average sales volume is about 49 thousand euros (exp(ln(10.799)). About 4% of the firms 
are foreign owned, and 8% has more than one establishment. Regarding the covariates that proxy for human 
FDSLWDODFFXPXODWLRQZRUNHUV¶PHDQSRWHQWLDOODERXUPDUNHWH[SHULHQFHLV\HDUVZKLOHPHDQVHQLRULW\LQ
the firm is nearly 6 years. On average, the composition of WKH ILUP¶s labour force involves 18% of high 
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skilled workers and 8% of university graduates. Considering our proxies on the stability of the labour force, 
RQDYHUDJHRIWKHILUPV¶ZRUNIRUFHLVHPSOR\HGZLWKWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWVDUHSDUW-timers, and 47% 
are women. In Table A1 in appendix we show correlations between the explanatory variables. 
15
 7DEOH$ LQDSSHQGL[ UHSRUWV WKH ILUPV¶ VL]H WUDQVLWLRQSDWWHUQVRYHU WKHSHULRGRIDQDO\VLV The sample 
contains 525,733 firms. In 98.5% of the cases, the mode was identified as the most observed size category. 
For the remaining 1.5% of the firms: (i) in 97% of the cases the size distribution was bimodal, and the mode 
was defined as the first observed modal size category; (ii) in 3% of the cases the mode was identified by the 
size category observed in more than 1/3 of the firm-year observations. 
16
 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the main effects of the time periods are statistically equal to those 
obtained in column 1. 
17
 We have tested the joint significance of the firm size variables and also performed a joint test that all 
coefficients associated with the interactions between time period and size are zero. All covariates are jointly 
statistically significant with a p-value below 1%. 
18
 Following the strategy by Varum and Rocha (2012) we have estimated a model combining the effect of the 
two crises. These results confirm that smaller firms are more likely to shutdown than larger firms. We also 
find that the hazard for firm shutdown during the combined crisis period is nearly twice that of the pre-crisis 
period. The interactions with the firm size provide support for the result on the increased risk of closing of 
medium sized firms during crisis (see Table A3 in appendix).  
19
 We also examine whether the firm size results are affected by the exclusion of the log(sales volume). 
Excluding this variable makes little difference in the results reported here, with an exception for the 
interaction term of small firms with the Sovereign Debt Crisis where we find a positive and significant 
coefficient (these results are available upon request). The best fitting models (larger log-likelihood) are those 
WKDWLQFOXGHFRQWUROVIRUWKHILUPV¶VDOHVYROXPH  
20
 These results are in line with previous work, e.g. Mata and Portugal (1994), Pakes and Ericson (1995), 
Huynh and Petrunia (2016) 
21
 We have tested the hypothesis that each coefficient of size of the models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 
are equal to the estimated parameter of the firms modal size category in column (1). We reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of medium and small firms in columns (2) and (3) are equal to the estimated parameters 
in column (1). 
22
 7KHYDULDEOH³&KDQJHLQHPSOR\PHQW´UHSRUWVfirm level changes in the number of employees between t-1 
and t and takes the values: 0 if no change; 1 if the number of employees decreased; and 2 if the number of 
employees increased. 
23
 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the main effects of the size categories, change in employment, and 
time periods are statistically equal to those obtained in column 5. 
24
 We have tested the joint significance of the firm size variables and also performed a joint test that all 
coefficients associated with the interactions between time period and size are zero. All covariates are jointly 
statistically significant with a p-value below 1%. 
25
 We have tested the hypothesis that each coefficient of size of the models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 
are equal to the estimated parameter of firm size in column (1). For the specification in column (2) we reject 
the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient of medium sized firms is equal to the estimated parameter in 
column (1). We also reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of medium and small firms in column (3) are 
equal to the estimated parameters in column (1). 
26
 A further interesting test to the robustness of our results is the study of differences in the determinants of 
survival rates of firms created during the Financial Crisis and of firms created during the Sovereign Debt 
crisis. Unfortunately, our data does not have enough time periods (it ends in 2012, as of yet) to perform this 
sort of analysis properly. 
27
 In columns 1 and 2 the baseline is the pre-crisis period, in column 3 the Financial Crisis period is 
contrasted with all other observations, while in column 4 the Sovereign Debt Crisis period is contrasted with 
all other observations. 
28
 In columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) the baseline is the pre-crisis period; in columns (3) and (7) the Financial 
Crisis period is contrasted with all other observations; in columns (4) and (8) the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
period is contrasted with all other observations. 
